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Abstract
How to classify the human condition? This is one of the main problems psychiatry has
struggled with since the first diagnostic systems. The furore over the recent editions of the
diagnostic systems DSM 5 and ICD-11 has evidenced it to still pose a wicked problem.
Recent advances in techniques and methods of artificial intelligence and computing power
which allows for the analysis of large data sets have been proposed as a possible solution for
this and other problems in classification, diagnosing and treating mental disorders. However,
mental disorders contain some specific inherent features which require critical consideration
and analysis. The promises of AI for mental disorders are threatened by the unmeasurable
aspects of mental disorders, and for this reason the use of AI may lead to ethically and
practically undesirable consequences in its effective processing. We consider such novel and
unique questions AI presents for mental health disorders in detail and evaluate potential
novel, AI-specific, ethical implications.
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Introduction
Nearly one in seven people globally are afflicted by a mental health disorder.1 This number is
a likely underestimation of the true prevalence. The costs are not only limited to human
suffering or decreased quality of life, but also constitute a considerable financial burden.
Gustavsson and colleagues have calculated the direct and indirect costs of mental disorders in
Europe to account for €462 billion.2 In the United States the costs are estimated to be higher,
in line with the generally higher health care expenditures in the US compared to Europe.
Globally, the direct and indirect costs to account for $2.5 trillion in 2010 with an estimated
increase to $6 trillion by the year 2030.3
Mental health disorders are treatable, and both human and financial costs can be mitigated.
To better diagnose, specify and treat mental health disorders requires a multipronged
approach ranging from governance and health care system to individual treatment providers.
Artificial intelligence (AI) has been proposed to have a significant positive impact on these
issues, similarly as it has been proposed to improve performance in other fields of health
care.e.g., 4,5 While we agree with this assessment, we also maintain that mental health differs
from other health issues in important ways. Consequently, in order to utilise AI in the context
of mental health successfully, some additional hurdles and special cases posed by features
inherent in mental health classification, conceptualization and treatment need to be
considered.
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To explore the philosophical and ethical issues, we focus on three broad themes, namely
detection, diagnosis, and treatment, leaving aside research and clinical administration even if
they occasionally overlap with our themes. These themes have been prominent also in earlier
reviews of AI technologies applied to mental health.e.g., 6–9 However, as our considerations are
philosophical and ethical in nature, they extend and differ to a degree with the main results of
the existing literature. Specifically, we consider how these technologies raise novel and
unique philosophical questions for detection, diagnosing and treatment of mental health
disorders and further evaluate whether these carry novel ethical implications that are AI-
specific and need be taken into account in implementation in this kind of setting.
Let us begin, however, by explicating what the technologies included in our considerations
are, and why we think their use in mental health might raise novel ethical implications, in
particular. First, what exactly is AI for mental health? In this article, we use the term AI
broadly as consisting of all computer programs, or systems that include computer programs
(e.g., humanoid robots), that have been developed to replicate the intelligent functions of
humans (clinicians), and we consider those in relation to mental health care. This conception
of AI is purposefully very general, as we do not want to unnecessarily exclude from our
consideration the technologies that are likely to have a significant impact on mental health
care. Thus, our conception includes various machine learning algorithms (such as supervised
and unsupervised learning) that are often used for screening and diagnosing purposes. It also
includes complex hybrid cognitive architectures (i.e., which combine symbolic and parallel
distributed processing), likely to be more useful in the treatment and therapeutic contexts, and
systems that are used either as augmenting the human decision making or in autonomous
decision making in screening, diagnostics, and treatment.
The use of AI has surged in all areas of modern life, from Netflix recommendation systems to
grading student essays, from predicting weather patterns to vehicles with autonomous driving
systems. This has, nevertheless, occurred to a lesser degree in the (public) health care—this is
not to say that it has not happened, and indeed it has significantly changed, say, the early
phases of drug development.e.g., 10,11 In fact, there is an ever-increasing number of studies and
the systems under development show great promise in this sector too.4,5,12 The highly
publicised cases most often involve diagnoses (e.g., how AI can diagnose different types of
cancers and eye-diseases or interpret X-ray images as well as an experienced physician).
Moreover, the use of AI has also been successful in identifying and prioritizing patients at
risk for developing diseases in the (near) future.
The reason why we think AI use in mental health might raise novel ethical implications, or at
least stresses the old ones, is the nature of the “problem base” it concerns. Whereas the
above-mentioned example of use of AI to detect cancer concerns with well-defined objective
parameters (i.e., data is given in pictures, and diagnostic criteria and the treatment options for
cancer are clear), this does not apply to many (most?) mental disorders. Quite the contrary,
mental health has to do with decidedly subjective and social phenomena, which makes their
detection, diagnosis and treatment less clear cut than those of more objectively defined health
conditions, which, too, have their own challenges for instance regarding overdiagnoses
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(Rogers & Mintzker 2016; Hofmann 2017). In what follows, we will next turn to explicate
these problems first in the relation of diagnosis and then turn to treatment.
The challenges of detection and diagnosis for AI
Let us assume that we are able to conceptualise mental disorders in an AI friendly way.
Presumably this would lead to adopting of various AI systems that can be used for diagnosing
mental health issues. If the success of AI technologies in other areas is of any indication, this
would change the detection and diagnosis of mental health dramatically. For example, the
technologies would likely to be scalable so that more are more people could be screened cost-
effectively. In principle, the diagnosis might improve too, as AI would not be prone to
cognitive errors and, say, could base its assessment on data that is difficult for a human to
utilise. For instance, AI systems can be taught to process different kinds of data sets, ranging
from the medical history of subjects visiting hospitals to their (or some populations’) use of
social media, thus to improve the early detection of mental health related issues. This, in turn,
could lead to either preventing mental disorders from reaching diagnostic thresholds
altogether, or mitigating their development by timely and appropriate early interventions. AI
could act as a form of “preventive medicine” in this respect far earlier than any attempt to
seek help for symptoms takes place. It is worth noting that this is not merely wishful thinking.
Quite the contrary, mechanisms for early detection of prodromal psychosis or the onset of a
manic phase in Bipolar Disorder (BD) that allow us to prevent, mitigate, and manage the
course of illness have already been developed. It is possible to track, for example,
smartphone data and assess acoustic features of speech to predict the onset of a manic phase
of BD.e.g., 13
Above we have illustrated reasons for developing these technologies. They, however, come
with a recognised price in other contexts. That price may even rise in mental health context,
as we suggest. In this section, due to the limited space we identify only three of them, but go
through these three one by one.
To begin with, the “essence” of mental ailments is far from agreed upon in disciplines that
look into their aetiology, symptoms and potential cure.14 In fact, classifying mental disorder
has been notoriously challenging and yet it has direct consequences on how people are able to
live their lives. For instance, the diagnostic category of gender dysphoria (DSM-5) or gender
identity disorder (F64 ICD-10) is problematic, as not every individual satisfying these criteria
necessarily requires treatment or arguably suffer from mental disorders.e.g., 15 Moreover, there
are several culture-bound disorders in both ICD and DSM which highlight how context and
culture affects the way psychological distress is presented and evaluated. Additionally,
Hacking separates human kinds from natural kinds, where the former are specified by
“looping effects”.16 In short, looping effects are at play when we create classifications which,
when taken into use, change the people and behaviour they denote. Several mental disorder
categories can be considered to entail looping effects. This interplay makes classification
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more problematic, as it cannot be detached from its cultural and socio-historical
circumstances.
It is useful to compare this with the successful cases of the use of AI in other sectors of health
care. Arguably, what is common to all or most of the latter cases is that they concern
phenomena in which the items that AI takes into account are well-defined and measurable,
and there are established criteria based on which to assess the success. For instance, when AI
screens images for eye-diseases, we know what the nature of the relevant data is (pictures
showing subjects’ eyes, retina, and so forth) and we have classifications for various diseases.
Although in some cases we might not have pre-established classifications (i.e., when we use
unsupervised learning algorithms), the used data is still well-founded and measurable, and
there is consensus as to the relevance (and soundness) of the classifications AI suggests.
This is not obviously so with many mental health issues. Quite the contrary, most of them are
decidedly subjective—it is a person who suffers from depression or panic attacks—and the
relevant data comes from their subjective reports. This assumes, of course, that the subjects
are willing and able to report their subjective reality, which is not a given. If they are not,
then the subjective reports might conflict, to some degree, with their external behaviour. How
to interpret such situations, when it is uncertain whether the subjects are really suffering from
mental disorders (and not merely exhibit a slightly deviating behavioural patterns, which we
all do in different contexts). Adding to the complexity of finding automatic solutions for
mental health diagnosis, many mental health issues include social components or are
intimately related to the social environment subjects belong to. It is an open question how
those can be measured and taken into account. However, this is not the case only for AI but
for the scientific community and the society as a whole.
What is more, the data for mental health diagnoses comes in several forms, as people report
their conditions differently and pay attention to different aspects. The data is typically
incomplete in some way (e.g., it may include the number of social encounters, but describe
their nature only superficially). Then again, if subjective reports of one’s feelings and the
nature of social encounters are ignored or dismissed as irrelevant, we risk missing the very
central features of the phenomena in question and thus reducing it to something that they are
not. We are not arguing that there are or can be no measurable features present in mental
disorders, but we are questioning whether these objectively measured correlations suffice for
diagnoses in mental health and, maybe even more importantly, for assessing individuals’
treatment needs. Leaving aside salient features of subjective experience and social factors
runs the risk of simplifying the categories to the extent that the phenomenon is misconstrued.
One particular place in which this problem could emerge relates to the above-mentioned
point that AI could aid us in increasing the specificity of mental disorder categories too.
Given the high comorbidity of mental disorders (approximately half of people present more
than one disorder),17,18 and the fact that diagnostic concepts in psychiatry rarely meet
stringent validity criteria,e.g., 19 it is likely that an AI classifier would carve diagnoses
differently from the current tradition. While this would create obvious problems in the current
treatment provision and service structure, it could help understand difficult problems such as
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differing or even negative treatment responses to certain treatments. Ideally, it would allow a
step closer to Kraepelin’s dictum “it is necessary to turn away from arranging illnesses in
orderly well‐defined groups, and to set ourselves the undoubtedly higher and more satisfying
goal of understanding their essential structure”.20 However, the ethical concerns would be
broad, as such approaches increase the likelihood of finding spurious patterns from noise, and
would generate new categories on how to understand human suffering.
The previous considerations do not mean, of course, that it is altogether impossible to use AI
to determine and use criteria for diagnosing mental disorders. Rather, the point is only to
emphasise the difficulties in accomplishing those functions. But, it is also worth noting that
once we finally succeed in it, and even though classification and standardisation of
diagnostics has its assets, it also has its downsides: When we develop fixed classes and
criteria the chosen features are highlighted and the practices become locked. This would not
be a problem had we the right features, but if only a few relevant and salient aspects are
chosen, this will lead gradually to bias. The uncontrolled and contested diagnoses and views
of mental disorders may have been a problem in their own right,21 but this kind of “wild
practice” would have arguably evened out the biases and prevented strong biases from
developing. AI uses standardised measures and this is likely to enhance the biases as the
technology makes the detection, diagnosis and treatment more and more effective.
As a final point related to the criteria used for diagnosing mental disorders, we want to
emphasise that the detection of early signs of brain change in imaging reinforces the idea that
mental disorders are naturalised. The AI can probably detect finer nuances and make more
precise readings of the images than a human being doing the same task. This has already been
noted at least in cancer screenings.22 Lynette Reid argues that the way in which the cancer is
diagnosed also tells about the concept of disease in question. The critique of overdiagnoses
typically involves this kind of dimension (see Rogers & Mintzker 2016, Hofmann 2017). The
same applies here. The mental disorder becomes a naturalistic change in the brain structure or
function and that may affect the way in which the disorder is understood. Equally
problematically, it is known that emphasising the biological aspect of mental disorders
reduces clinicians’ empathy23 and increases the attached stigma.24 Both of these effects
negatively affect treatment outcomes. In the worst case scenario, AI can reinforce these
effects, or alternatively provide solutions for avoiding them.
The second central issue we want to highlight here concerns the fact that some of the AI
technologies bring about issues of privacy in detection and diagnoses. Often they relate to
some kind of mass surveillance for public health concerns and their use is balanced with the
assumed benefits gained. The tracking of the movement of individuals in the age of COVID-
19 illustrates the issue well—the benefits of tracking movement for the public health
outweigh the harms for the individual in question. There are of course ethical challenges
related to such surveillance, but by and large they are not novel and rather highlight old ones.
The detection of behaviour indicative of mental health conditions (pre-diagnosis) for example
in social media, however, often deals with questions of privacy and surveillance for the
individuals. What is ethically relevant is how much the individual in question can influence
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her exposure to risks in these kinds of practices without loss of social benefits that justify this
kind of exposure (Rogers, Entwistle & Carter 2019). In modern-day preventive medicine
such as screenings are typically optional: you may always opt out, but AI does not
automatically provide this kind of option, as it does not typically require consent for data
mining for detection purposes especially in “public domains” such as social media and
discussion platforms. The different venues from which the data is collected or processed in
do fall under different kinds of data regulations, such as in the European Union the General
Data Protection Regulation. However, unless the social media service user actually is aware
that the AI processes the public data for early detection, the consenter may easily or is even
likely to miss this function. Indeed, the fact that users do not recognise how much
individualising data they give away (even though they have  consented to it) is one of the
reasons why Evan Selinger and Woodrow Harzog have argued that face recognition methods
should be banned.25 This starkly contrasts with health care, where it is the duty of the staff to
ensure that the patients have understood what they are consenting to.26
Finally, before we turn to discuss AI and the treatment of mental health, a final issue that we
hinted above needs to be mentioned: The current development of AI systems for diagnosis
purposes is likely to make the screening cost-effective at large scale and, if the issues related
to diagnosis criteria can be met, the accuracy of the diagnosis can be expected to be at least
comparable to those done by health care professionals. Furthermore, it can be argued that as
the detection becomes finer and finer, the issue of classifying disorders as instances that
require medical treatment increase even more even if some of these cases could turn out to be
overdiagnoses, i.e. diagnoses of conditions that would not otherwise have become clinically
significant (Reid, Carter, Hofmann & Rogers 2018). As a result, it is only to be expected that
increased detection would further burden the treatment sector considerably, especially if the
resources of helping and critical review of diagnoses do not grow at the same speed.
Of course, the projected situation is hardly untypical in the health care sector in general.
What could be uncommon though, is the extent at which this might occur and its impact. On
the one hand, it has been estimated that over 70 % of global population requiring treatment
for mental health do not receive it, and those who do, receive it either too late or in arguably
ineffective modalities, such as alternative or complementary medicine.27 On the other hand, it
has been suggested that long waiting times in mental health negatively affect treatment
engagement, symptom reduction and functional recovery.28,29 This means that tackling these
health issues as early as possible would be particularly beneficial. What we are thus facing is
a dilemma: in the not so distant future, presumably we can use AI to detect mental disorders
better and earlier than before. Yet, before AI-based treatment options are equally well-
developed, this could only make the future treatment more difficult and thus discourage us
from deploying those technologies.
Philosophical and ethical considerations of AI application for treatment
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Diagnosis is the beginning of the treatment, but before considering the potential of AI in the
means of treatment, it is worthwhile to focus on the outcome of diagnosing, i.e. the diagnosis
itself. Does it matter if a health care professional or an AI makes the diagnosis? As discussed
above, it may well be that AI is more reliable in taking into account all the symptoms and
scanning through the other possibilities and it is not prone to cognitive errors or struggle with
boredom or being tired.30 At the same time, it seems to lack the beginning of the therapeutic
relationship with a health care person. It is not a relationship in a strict sense, as it is not a
relation between individuals. Nonetheless, this need not be a negative thing. In fact, it may be
beneficial for individuals who struggle with human contact or are afraid of being judged and
stigmatised. It should, however, be kept in mind that social withdrawal is a core feature of
various mental disorders and is in general often considered to exacerbate the issues. One of
key concerns is how to avoid increasing social isolation and withdrawal.
More significantly, as it concerns most people who have been impacted by mental health
issues, the trust people have for an AI system to make the diagnosis may have two sides. The
reliability of its ability to scan through great amounts of data may be there, but at the same
time it does not have that “touch” that professionals could be argued to have stemming from
years of experience in practice. The AI might not possess this kind of ability to detect the “x-
factor”, something that is hard to pinpoint and articulate, but it is certainly something that we
immediately recognise when we come across it. Of course, not all health care personnel have
this kind of x-factor and the diagnoses the AI produces are all done in the same way which
can be further seen as making the health care system more reliable and trustworthy. The other
side of the coin here could be that the reliability of the technology undermines or threatens
the prestige of the personnel. This kind of polarisation requires further premises to become
notable, as it is not self-evident that this kind of juxtaposition takes place. The AI system and
the personnel can just as easily be regarded as features of the same institution, both of which
contribute to the reliability and trustworthiness of the providers of treatment.
The famous dodo-bird verdict states that the actual psychotherapeutic framework has a
smaller effect than the so-called common factors of psychotherapeutic treatments have. The
common factors include therapeutic alliance, empathy, goal consensus and collaboration,
positive regard and affirmation, mastery, congruence or genuineness, mentalization and
emotional experience.31 Most, if not all, of these features are very hard to maintain in non-
human interactions. Furthermore, the personal relationship aspect of mental health treatment
goes even beyond the psychotherapeutic setting. A re-analysis of a broad US’s National
Institute of Mental Health antidepressant study found the effect of the prescribed drug to be
lower than the effect of who was doing the prescription, that is, the psychiatrist.32 With regard
to AI, this raises the question of what exactly is the treatment? Is it possible that in
developing treatment providing AI we focus on an aspect of treatment that is in fact doing
little work, and fail to consider the human contact aspect of successful treatment? While
effort has mostly concentrated on creating intelligent pattern recognition AI’s or copying
specific manualized therapeutic techniques (for instance from Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy), there are also alternatives that have attempted to account for the aspect of physical
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presence. One example of such is the PARO, the therapeutic seal, which has been pilot tested
in dementia homes and with people suffering from chronic pain.e.g., 33
In counselling, AI agents have also been introduced in mental health settings. These agents
can be virtual such as avatars in virtual space or robots,30,34 and they raise issues regarding for
instance the therapeutic relationship that is regarded as one the most important aspects in
effective therapy, as mentioned above. There are several other issues, too. First of all, there is
the quality of the relationship. If the patient does not falsely believe that the AI agent is a
human being (which is another challenge30), the patient may, on the one hand, feel that the AI
agent cannot feel shame or other feelings and thus fails to understand the patient’s ordeals.
On the other hand, the patient, however, may find it easier to confide to an AI agent just
because it is an AI agent and not a human being.
Also, virtual reality treatments have been developed as adjunct treatments for conventional
counselling and psychotherapy for phobias,35–38 eating disorders,39 and post-traumatic stress
disorder.40,41 These have usually taken the form of Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy
(VRET), and constituted, for example, a virtual Afghanistan or Iraq in treating military
personnel with PTSD.42 Treatments that can be offered regardless of location and material
limitations enable access to mental health services for individuals previously deprived of
counselling or therapy due to their remote location, limited mental health care resources
available or other reasons such as shame.e.g., 7
The utilisation of mobile and sensor data to detect changes in behaviour indicative of mental
health conditions is one of the functions of AI technologies such as machine learning.8,34
Questions of epistemic authority arise when the reports of the individual are in conflict with
the sensory data. This is important especially in mental health context as mental disorders
typically cast doubt to the reliability of the individual to be competent to report such issues.
In some disorders such as pathological gambling, it is a diagnostic criterion in the DSM-5
categorization that the individuals feel the need to hide their actions (and potentially are ready
to lie about them). The articulated concern of ours realises once again: is it more likely that
the assessment of the state of the individual’s condition relies on the measurable and
naturalised data provided by the AI technology rather than the person reporting their
experience of how well rested or stressed they currently are. Also, the questions of
responsibility rise, as the health care professionals are not necessarily keen on taking more
responsibility of following this kind of data/supervising this kind of system. There is a risk of
the situation converging according to the Goodhart’s Law “when a measure becomes a target,
it ceases to be a good measure”. For example, using the common Beck Depression Inventory
as a way to evaluate treatment efficacy instead of severity assessment may itself alter the
treatment towards the items, which are easier to change (e.g. eating behaviour) than other
more serious symptoms (e.g. suicidality, hopelessness). Similarly, this weighing of symptoms
is something that is quite transparent for humans, but could prove wickedly opaque for AI.
Overall, this brings us back to the question of how to diagnose mental disorders: In so far as
the measurable data that AI uses for diagnosis purposes does not cover all relevant
information, there is the threat that measuring the success with such AI system will lead to
biases and new problems—resembling the curious and problematic case in which the
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behavior of psychiatric patients changed dramatically in almost overnight when Hospital
Romero in Buenos Aires began to diagnose them with DSM-classification.43
Machine learning has been applied to provide personalised and timely treatment or
interventions.8 The promises of customised treatment with AI systems ease the challenges
posed, for instance, by different cultural and ethnic backgrounds.7 The objective of this kind
of treatment is filled with good intentions: to provide the best care that particular individual
and steer away from the idea that one model fits all,44 particularly in mental health in which
there are all kinds of environmental and social factors as well as the aspects of the individual
which affect the disorder and consequently the treatment. Personalised medicine relies on
biomarkers and other naturalised factors and, in this respect, customised or personalised
mental health treatment runs the risk of reducing the condition to the biological or
neurological variables. As we have suggested above, this is hardly the best way to construe
mental disorders.
Furthermore, in the times of the COVID-19 pandemic, it could be asked what do the AI
systems take to be the framework in producing and processing data for treatment. The
societies have undergone dramatic changes in a couple of months’ period and the patients are
facing new challenges in their everyday lives. Are the systems flexible enough to
accommodate a whole new infrastructure to the behaviours? For example, some behaviours
necessitated by pandemics, such as physical distancing, are also symptomatic of various
mental disorders during standard times. Due to the way mental disorders are conceptualized
as non-normative behaviours and ways of being, there is a risk that AI would not accurately
react to a sudden contextual shift.
Concluding remarks
The promises of AI in mental health lay in increasing timely assessment and access to
treatment. For instance, AI can form a part of initial screening and act as an adjunct
assessment. Machine learning could ideally optimise diagnostic criteria, and—in the best
scenarios due to their scalability—AI systems could make treatment (especially therapies)
more accessible to those who would benefit from them. We have highlighted the point that in
various occasions such promises are threatened by the unmeasurable (or difficult-to-measure)
aspects of mental disorders, and for this reason the use of AI may lead to ethically and
practically undesirable consequences in its effective processing.
In this article we have not emphasised the issues of just health care system, for example equal
access and just allocation of resources, but this marginality is merely due to the limitations of
space, not due to lack of importance. We have focused solely on the AI issues connected to
the clinical practice. Moreover, most of the ethical issues of AI in mental health raise issues
that have been discussed before in different domains. The most notable difference between
human-provided mental health care and that of AI seems to be the question of responsibility.
Cases such as, for instance, malfunctions are an issue more controversial in relation to AI
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than to health care personnel with many codes of conduct that provide professional ethics to
the practitioners.e.g., 45
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